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The Refugee Act of 19801 attempted to establish a uniform and nonide-
ological procedure for considering applications by refugees for political
asylum in the United States.2 Charges persist, however, that foreign policy
and ideology still dominate the government's adjudication and litigation of
asylum claims, thereby thwarting the goals of the Act.' Even when a refu-
gee presents a strong asylum claim, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) generally contests the application by appealing an Immigra-
tion Judge's (IJ) decision.4 Although IJ denials of strong asylum claims
have been reversed or remanded by the federal courts,5 few asylum seekers
have the resources to appeal.8
This Note argues that unjustified government opposition to meritorious
asylum claims should be countered through the application of a federal
1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The Act was the
first comprehensive U.S. statute to regulate refugee admissions and resettlement.
2. As part of the Act, Congress incorporated the definition of refugee used in the 1967 U.N.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: any person demonstrating a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion, [who] is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to... return to it." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. I, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force for the United States on Nov.
1, 1968). Congress thus sought to abolish the previous U.S. system of explicit ideological and national
preferences in executive grants of asylum. The Refugee Act of 1980 eliminated the explicitly ideologi-
cally-based provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which granted "conditional
entry" visas to aliens who fled persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion "(I) from
any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country within the gen-
eral area of the Middle East," Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, § 203(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 178-79 (1952)), and replaced it with the new asylum statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1982). 0
For a comprehensive history of these ideological preference statutes and of the legislative history of
the 1980 Refugee Act, see Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981).
3. See, e.g., U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM
IN THE UNITED STATES 7-10 (1986); AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOC., COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION REGULATIONS (1987) (copy on file with
the author); Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN
DIE O L. REV. 999 (1985); Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984) [hereinafter Helton, Unfulfilled Promise]; Note, Politi-
cal Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450, 459 (1985).
4. See infra text accompanying note 77; see also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 46.
6. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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attorneys' fees award statute, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), to
deportation proceedings in which the government opposes asylum claims.
The EAJA awards attorneys' fees to a party who prevails against the
United States in any civil action or in any "adversary adjudications" by
federal agencies," in which the "position" of the agency is not "substan-
tially justified."' Application of the EAJA to asylum hearings will attract
more representation for asylum seekers, deter the INS through the threat
of fee awards, and expose more INS litigation to judicial review, which
should further reform and refine INS asylum policy.
This Note argues that the purposes and legislative history of the EAJA
justify its application to asylum hearings. In Escobar Ruiz v. INS [Esco-
bar Ruiz I],1O the first and only court to address the issue held that the
EAJA applied to deportation hearings, the forum in which asylum claims
are adjudicated. But the INS still opposes the EAJA's application to de-
portation hearings," and the status of the law in other circuits is untested.
Section I examines the history, purposes, and terms of the EAJA, espe-
cially as it applies to agency proceedings. Section II focuses on asylum
procedure and policies, and argues that application of the EAJA to asy-
lum hearings would serve the purposes of the Act by aiding asylum seek-
ers contesting unjustified INS opposition to their claims. Finally, Section
III proposes two changes to strengthen the EAJA's effectiveness in agency
proceedings: Congressional amendment of a key statutory term, and clari-
fication by the Justice Department of the process by which fee awards are
reviewed.
7. Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2321 (1981) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28
U.S.C. § 2412).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. IV 1986), pertains to fee awards made by federal courts in civil
cases (except tort cases) including proceedings for judicial review of agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 504
(Supp. IV 1986) contains very similar language but applies to awards made by agency adjudicators in
adversary adjudications.
9. The relevant portion of 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) states:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other
than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that
proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency
was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
10. 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Escobar Ruiz I], reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 283
(1987) [hereinafter Escobar Ruiz II], affd en banc, 838 F.2d 1020 (1988) [hereinafter Escobar Ruiz
III]. See infra Section IIB for a full description of the case.
11. The INS did not seek certiorari but indicated that it will seek to reverse the holding of Esco-
bar Ruiz III by litigating a "more appropriate" future case in the Supreme Court. No Supreme Court
Review in Escobar Ruiz, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 540 (May 23, 1988). Further, the INS has
stated that it will not comply with the holding of Escobar Ruiz III even within the Ninth Circuit, "in
order to bring the matter before the Supreme Court at the earliest possible moment." INS Refuses to
Be Bound by Escobar-Ruiz, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 899, 900 (Sept. 2, 1988).
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I. THE EAJA: TERMS AND BASIC PURPOSE
A. History of Fee Award Provisions
The EAJA, originally enacted as an experiment, 12 significantly
changed existing law by permitting attorneys' fees awards against the gov-
ernment in civil actions and in adversary agency adjudications. Under the
common law "American Rule," parties in litigation traditionally pay for
their own attorneys' fees and costs, except where attorneys' fees are specif-
ically authorized by statute.13 The American Rule became subject to in-
creasing attack in the 1960's and 1970's, and courts began to experiment
with new exceptions to the doctrine.1 The most significant of these new
judicial exceptions, the "private attorney general" theory, 15 was abolished
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.' 6 In response to
Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976,11 which permitted prevailing parties in actions brought under cer-
tain civil rights statutes to collect attorneys' fees. Four years later, Con-
gress enacted a far more comprehensive attorneys' fees bill, the EAJA, to
enable small parties,' who might otherwise be unable to afford to assert
12. The EAJA was passed with a sunset clause under which its key provisions expired automati-
cally in 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 203(c), 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2327, 2329 (1982). In 1985,
Congress passed new legislation which permanently reenacted and amended the EAJA in important
respects. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183
(1985) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. 2412 (Supp. IV 1986)).
The EAJA has been supported by an unusual coalition of small business organizations, whose
members are often victims of unjustified government actions, and civil rights groups. H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4986
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1418]. Groups who have testified in support of the EAJA include the
ACLU, Congress Watch, the Council for Public Interest Law, the National Federation of Indepen-
dent Businesses and the Small Business Loan Council. 1d; see also H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 132, 135 [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 120].
13. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). The American
Rule was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306
(1796). There are two traditional narrow common law exceptions to the rule: when the losing party
has acted in "bad faith" he may be obliged to pay attorney fees (bad faith exception), or when a
successful party preserves or creates a benefit for a group, the court may permit her to recover fees
from the beneficiaries (common benefit exception). See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
Congress has enacted many specific statutory exceptions to the American Rule. For a sample list,
see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4987.
14. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544.
15. This theory allowed private plaintiffs to collect attorneys' fees against private parties, even in
the absence of specific statutory authority, when their suits vindicated certain public rights. Id. at 544
n.15. Courts that followed this doctrine reasoned that when litigants helped enforce certain broad
rights and interests promoted by, for example, civil rights and environmental legislation, they should
not have to pay the costs of the litigation. Winold, Institutionalizing an Experiment: The Extension
of the Equal Access to Justice Act - Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 925, 927 (1987).
16. 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) ("[Clongressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept
can in no way be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the [American] rule.").
17. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
18. Eligibility for an EAJA award is limited to individuals with a net worth of less than $2
million, businesses with a net worth of less than $7 million and nonprofit organizations of any size. 5
U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
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their legal rights, to defend against or seek review of unreasonable govern-
ment action.19
B. Purposes of the EAJA
The EAJA has three principal purposes. First, the EAJA seeks to aid
victims of unjustified government action who might be deterred by the cost
of litigation from legally contesting such action.2" Congress intended the
EAJA to prevent the government from coercing compliance with its posi-
tion merely because the affected individuals lacked the funds to litigate
against the government.21 Congress wanted to ensure that individuals,
small businesses, and other organizations would decide on the merits
rather than on their fear of high attorneys' fees whether or not to defend
against or seek review of unjustified government action.22
A second goal of the EAJA is to deter such unjustified government ac-
tion by the threat of sizeable awards of attorneys' fees which would come
from agency budgets."3 By requiring that the government prove that its
position is substantially justified or face liability for a fee award, 4 Con-
gress also intended to "caution agencies to carefully evaluate their case
and not to pursue those which are weak or tenuous."2- 5
A third objective is to expose, by statutory revival of the private attor-
ney general theory,26 more governmental action to "adversarial testing...
to refine the administration of federal law-to foster greater precision,
efficiency and fairness in the interpretation of statutes and in the formula-
tion and enforcement of governmental regulations. 2 7 Congress felt that
the EAJA would promote more agency adjudications, which would often
bring to light and correct inaccurate or erroneous agency policy or
action.28
19. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4988. The EAJA is a general statutory exception to
the American Rule. Only common law and specific statutory exceptions to the American Rule existed
prior to the enactment of the EAJA. Id. at 4986-87.
20. The American Rule was based on a desire not to deter litigation by penalizing a losing party
for having brought or defended a lawsuit. But, the House Report concluded: "[Iun litigation with the
Government, the American rule is in fact having the opposite effect. For many citizens, the costs of
securing vindication of their rights and the inability to recover attorney fees preclude resort to the
adjudicatory process." Id. at 4988.
21. Id. "[T]he Government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce compli-
ance with its position .... [and thus] precedent may be established on the basis of an uncontested
order rather than the thoughtful presentation and consideration of opposing views." Id.
22. See, H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 132-33.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4991; see also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539,
550 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
24. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4993.
26. See supra note 15. The EAJA and the private attorney general theory are based on the
premise that "a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the Government is not only representing
his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy." H.R. REP. No.
1418, supra note 12, at 4988.
27. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 550 n.41.
28. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4989.
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C. Key Terms of the EAJA
To win an EAJA award an applicant must show that she is an eligible
"prevailing party." 29 Courts have generally held that to be a "prevailing
party" one need only succeed on any significant issue which achieves some
of the benefit sought by the parties.30 The government must then show
that its "position" 3' in the adjudication was "substantially justified," 2 or
that "special circumstances" would make an award unjust, 3 or it will be
liable for an EAJA fee award. 4
29. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1986 Supp. IV).
30. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 716
F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
31. A key amendment to the EAJA in 1985 resolved the split in the circuits over the meaning of
the term "position" of the agency. Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 1(a)(1), l(b)(1)(E), 2(b), 99 Stat. 183,
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 504 (a)(1), (b)(1)(E), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(2)(D)). Following the enactment
of the EAJA in 1981, some circuits followed the more restrictive "litigation theory": In determining
whether the "position" of the government was substantially justified, the reviewing court or agency
adjudicator would look only at the government's litigation position, and not at the underlying agency
position-the facts which formed the basis of the litigation or adjudication. Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
For example, if the government is a defendant it may present a technical defense, such as lack of
jurisdiction, which is unrelated to the merits of the underlying action. Although the government may
lose, by presenting only that defense-assuming that lack of jurisdiction is a substantially justified, or
reasonable, legal argument-the government could escape liability for EAJA fees under the litigation
theory, regardless of how unreasonable its original action was.
Congress in 1985 ratified the broader "underlying action" approach, in which the court or Admin-
istrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewing a fee application would look at both the government's legal
arguments and the prelitigation facts of the case on the record to make the substantial justification
determination. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 140-42; Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese,
791 F.2d 1489, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1986).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (Supp. IV 1986). The Supreme
Court recently addressed the split in the circuits concerning the interpretation of the "substantially
justified" standard. In Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988), the Court held that the standard
should be essentially one of reasonableness. This ruling may limit the effectiveness of the EAJA and
reduce government liability for awards, given that since the 1985 reenactment of the EAJA, many
courts had been imposing a higher, "more than mere reasonableness" standard on the government. See
infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
33. Only in rare cases has the government escaped liability for an EAJA award under this provi-
sion. For instance, only two of 95 EAJA application denials in the federal courts in 1987 were made
because special circumstances made an award unjust. 1987 DIRECTOR ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. CTs.
ANN. REP. 101 [hereinafter 1987 C's. REP.].
34. A recent case illustrates how the EAJA works in agency adjudications. In Phil Smidt & Son
v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1987), a former employee of a small company had sought backpay
after proving that she had been wrongfully discharged. An NLRB official investigating the case wrote
to the company twice, first directing payment of $920 to the employee, but then later demanding
payment of more than $5,000, based on an affidavit by the employee which falsely claimed that her
tax returns were erroneous and that she had suffered a loss of income after her discharge. The com-
pany refused to pay such a large amount and a hearing was set solely to determine the amount of
backpay. Id. at 639-40.
Before the start of the hearing the company offered to pay the original determination of $920. But
the NLRB General Counsel rejected this settlement offer and at the hearing the ALJ found that the
company owed only $631, even less than the original NLRB demand. Id. at 640-41.
Having prevailed in the NLRB adjudication, the company sought attorneys' fees by filing an EAJA
application with the ALJ. The ALJ dismissed the application, and a panel of the NLRB affirmed, on
the grounds that the NLRB General Counsel's position in the case was substantially justified because
its legal arguments at the hearing were reasonable. Id. at 641.
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the NLRB panel's denial of fees because it was based on
the wrong legal standard and was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 643. The court found
The Yale Law Journal
EAJA awards for attorneys' fees in agency adjudications have been
rare. In the first three years after the passage of the EAJA, the number of
applications and awards and the total dollar amount of all EAJA awards
fell far below expectations. 5 The lack of applications and the low number
of awards were particularly striking in administrative agency adjudica-
tions, where Congress had believed that many awards would be made.36
Even when the number and amount of court awards increased,37 the num-
ber of administrative awards remained extremely low leading many to
proclaim the EAJA a failure in agency proceedings. 8 An alternative ex-
planation is that during the Reagan years there has been less agency ac-
tivity and fewer enforcement initiatives which would spur EAJA applica-
tions.39 In either case the consistently small number of agency applications
and the low percentage of applications which result in awards, compared
with the significantly higher numbers for comparable court cases, suggest
that flaws in the statute itself limited the EAJA's impact in agency adju-
dications in its first three years.
For example, the provisions in the original Act governing standards for
judicial review of fee decisions were arguably too restrictive. Judicial re-
view of administrative fee adjudications was discretionary with the federal
courts and was under an abuse of discretion standard.40 Congress had
feared that a large volume of routine appeals of agency fee denials would
flood the federal courts."' But during the three years that this narrow
that the NLRB Regional Director's position was not substantially justified because it lacked a reason-
able basis in fact, regardless of the legal arguments. The court found that the Regional Director made
a factual error in increasing the backpay demand, despite the presence of clear evidence which the
Regional Director's office had at the time that should have indicated the error and obviated the need
for a hearing.
35. The Congressional Budget Office (OBO) estimated that EAJA awards during fiscal years
1982-84 would be $310 million, based on an estimated 11,200 court awards and 8,100 administrative
agency awards. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4999-5002. The actual amount of all EAJA
awards during those three years was less than $4 million and the total number of awards was less
than 200. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12 at 137.
36. The OBO estimated that awards would be made in some 2,700 administrative cases per year,
with an average award of $7,200 for a total cost to the government of S19.4 million in fiscal year
1982, and $62 million total for fiscal years 1982-84. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at
4999-5002. But during fiscal years 1982-1984 only 21 awards were made by administrative agencies,
while 223 applications were denied and 160 were still pending. The total amount of the awards was
less than $158,000 for those three years. 1985 CHAIRMAN ADMIN. CONF. U.S. ANN. REP. ON
AGENCY AcTiviTis UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT app. IV [hereinafter 1985 ACUS
REP.].
37. Between 1982 and 1985 the number of applications granted in U.S. courts increased from 10
to 420. The percentage of applications granted also increased, from less than 50% in 1982 to more
than 70% in 1985. The total amount awarded grew from S264,339 to S1,912,768 in that same period.
1987 CTs. REP., supra note 33, at 97.
38. See Stewart, The Equal Access to Justice Act: a Failure in Agency Proceedings?, Nat'l L.J.,
May 21, 1984, at 20, col. 1; Law to Fund Suits Against Agencies Called Ineffective, L.A. Daily J.,
June 2, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
39. Telephone interview with Mary Candace Fowler, Staff Attorney, Administrative Conference
of the United States (Apr. 20, 1988).
40. Parties seeking review of an ALJ's denial of their fee request had to file for leave to appeal.
Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203(c)(2), 96 Stat. 2325, 2326 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4995. Congress also made denial of a petition for
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judicial review provision of the original EAJA was in effect, few adminis-
trative fee denials were reviewed, and fewer still were reversed."2 Thus,
when Congress extended and amended the EAJA in 1985, it was no
longer concerned with a flood of cases. Congress expanded the opportu-
nity for judicial review by providing for an automatic right to appeal ad-
ministrative fee decisions, and by changing the standard of review from
abuse of discretion to substantial evidence on the record of the agency. 3
This liberalized standard of judicial review made possible awards in cases
such as Phil Smidt & Son v. NLRB.44 Expanded judicial review is espe-
cially important given the low number of agency awards, and the obvious
reluctance of agency administrators to grant large awards out of their own
budgets, even in the rare cases where they do make awards."5 In the asy-
lum context, judicial review is especially important because so many sig-
nificant legal victories have been won in the federal courts on appeal from
agency adjudications.46
II. APPLICATION OF THE EAJA TO ASYLUM PROCEEDINGS
This Section describes current asylum application and adjudication pro-
cedure and then reviews the legal debate over whether the EAJA applies
to those adjudications. It argues that the EAJA should apply to asylum
adjudications by demonstrating that the EAJA's three objectives will be
furthered by its use in that context.
A. Asylum Procedure
Asylum is one of two principal forms of statutory relief available to an
alien in the United States who claims that she will be persecuted if de-
ported to her country of origin. 7 Asylum is a temporary but highly de-
leave to appeal unreviewable. Id.
42. From 1982-1984 the courts granted only four of seven petitions leave to appeal an agency's
fee determination, and reversed the agency in only one of those cases. 1982 DIREcTOR ADMIN. OFF.
U.S. Crs. ANN. REP 183; 1983 DIRECrOR ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 82; 1984 DIRECTOR
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Cis. ANN. REP. 93.
43. Pub. L. No. 99-80, § (1)(d), 99 Stat. 183, 184 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(e)(2)). Congress
believed that the new language was more consistent with the normal scope of judicial review of ad-
ministrative actions. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 145.
44. 810 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1987); see supra note 34.
45. See supra note 100.
46. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the administrative appellate court for asylum hear-
ings, has been reversed often. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) (reversing
BIA and holding "well-founded fear" standard for asylum not equivalent to higher standard of "clear
probability" of persecution for withholding of deportation); Desir v. Ilehert 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.
1988) (BIA erred in concluding that beatings, arrests and assaults on Haitian did not constitute politi-
cal persecution); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The BIA has frequently
resorted to catchall statements in its asylum decisions... [regardless of whether correct legal standard
was actually applied]."); Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1987) (BIA's discretionary
denial of asylum was abuse of discretion where Board failed to weigh or even mention well-founded
fear of asylum seeker).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). The other principal statutory remedy is a "withholding of depor-
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sired form of relief because it permits an alien to apply for permanent
residence status after one year and to receive important benefits such as
work authorization.48
To gain asylum an applicant must first establish eligibility for relief by
demonstrating a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."'49 Then, the IJ must exercise the discretion delegated by the At-
torney General, to grant or deny asylum.50 Asylum adjudication thus in-
volves two separate determinations which are subject to different stan-
dards of judicial review. Federal courts review asylum eligibility
determinations under a substantial evidence standard and the discretion-
ary determination is reviewed under abuse of discretion."1
The asylum seeker may follow two different procedural routes to gain
asylum but can probably only recover EAJA fees by following the second
of these. First, if no deportation proceedings have been instituted against
her, she may affirmatively apply for asylum by requesting an interview
with the office of the local district director of the INS. 2 In most cases, the
EAJA would probably not apply to the district director's decision on an
affirmative application for asylum because there is no adversary adjudica-
tion and the government is not represented by counsel. 3
tation," under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). In contrast to asylum, the Attorney General is required to with-
hold deportation if an IJ determines that an alien's freedom would be threatened upon return to her
native country on the basis of her "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." Id.; see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (alien must show "clear probability
of persecution" to be eligible for withholding). Thus withholding of deportation is mandatory if the
alien meets the statutory requirements for eligibility. Asylum, by contrast, is discretionary. See Car-
doza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1211 n.6.
48. 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(b) provides that the Attorney General may revoke a grant of asylum if
changed conditions in the asylee's country of nationality make him ineligible.
There is no limit on the number of persons who may receive grants of asylum each year, but only
5,000 asylees may become permanent residents in a given year. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982). Work
authorization is now mandatory for any asylum applicant who can show she has filed a "nonfrivo-
lous" application. 8 C.F.R. §§ 274(a.12(c))(1988). For a discussion of the INS's interpretation of
"nonfrivolous," see 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 873 (July 27, 1987).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982).
50. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1988). Congress made asylum discretionary primarily to prevent refu-
gees who could resettle in a third country from receiving asylum. See generally D. MARTIN, MAJOR
ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 81 & n.43 (1987). For a full exploration of the increasingly important
and evolving standards of discretion, see Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedyfor Refu-
gees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987).
51. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 n.6 (1987).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1988). After the interview, the INS sends the application to the State Depart-
ment for an advisory opinion (district directors and IJs are required to request these advisory opinions
under existing INS regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1988)), and then issues a grant or
denial. If the INS rejects the claim, the applicant may not appeal directly, but may renew the claim
before an IJ, who would review the matter de novo, if the INS institutes deportation hearings. 8
C.F.R. § 208.9 (1988). The INS has proposed new asylum regulations which would eliminate the
role of district directors, replacing them with specially trained asylum officers. 53 Fed. Reg. 11,300
(1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3, 208, 236, 242 & 253) (proposed Apr. 6, 1988).
53. See infra notes 65-67. When Congress in 1985 expanded the scope of the "position" of the
agency which must be substantially justified to include underlying agency action, see supra note 31, it
concluded that the government would not be liable for "mere preliminary or procedural decisions
which would not be subject to judicial review." H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 141. Thus, a
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The EAJA would, however, apply to appellate review of an asylum
claim raised in a second way: during a deportation hearing before an IJ."
The decision of the IJ is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), whose decision may be appealed directly to the federal courts of
appeals, and from there to the Supreme Court.5
The government may be exposed to liability for an EAJA award in
asylum hearings for either appealing a grant of asylum by an IJ, 6 or for
contesting an asylum seeker's appeal of an IJ denial.5" Liability might
arise where the court of appeals determines that the IJ or the BIA applied
the wrong legal standards or failed to articulate the reasons for a denial of
asylum, and the government's argument on appeal lacks substantial
justification."8
This is an unusual posture for EAJA agency adjudications. In other
district director's decision would probably not be subject to EAJA coverage because it would be con-
sidered a "preliminary decision" not subject to judicial review.
54. Procedurally, two distinct entities within the Justice Department participate in asylum adju-
dication: 1) The INS, which litigates against asylum seekers and is thus liable for fee awards; and 2)
the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), an independent unit of IJs who conduct depor-
tation hearings (the forum in which asylum claims are adjudicated) and the five member BIA, which
reviews IJ decisions de novo. The EOIR was established by regulation in 1983 to provide for IJ
independence from the INS. Previously, IJs were a part of the INS and depended on the local INS
district director for budgetary and administrative support See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMI-
GRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 87-91 (1985).
In most cases EAJA fees would be available only on appeals of an IJ's decision. See infra notes
56-58.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982). The federal circuit court of appeals reviews asylum eligibility
decisions under a "substantial evidence" standard. Id. § 1105 (a)(4).
56. See, e.g., In Re Issam Arabo, (1988) (unpublished IJ decisioh on file with author). In that
case the IJ awarded EAJA fees after the INS first appealed the IJ's decision granting Arabo discre-
tionary adjustment of status relief, but then dropped the appeal. The IJ awarded fees only for the
work performed by Arabo's attorney contesting the meritless appeal. Id. at 3.
57. See Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 520 (1st Cir. 1987) (success at
preliminary stages may be some evidence of substantial justification, but not dispositive). A common
scenario under which fees might be awarded is if the court of appeals finds the asylum seeker eligible
for asylum because the record demonstrates a well-founded fear, but remands for a discretionary
determination by the BIA. Success on the eligibility issue would most likely constitute success on a
significant issue and the appellant could be eligible for EAJA fees for work performed by his attorney
on that issue before the BIA, even though the BIA may have ultimately denied asylum on discretion-
ary grounds.
58. The INS could be liable for EAJA fies in a deportation hearing where no appeal is taken if
the asylum seeker contests the grounds for deportation. Suppose the asylum seeker affirmatively ap-
plies for asylum and after an interview the district director denies her application. She cannot appeal
the decision but thereafter the INS attempts to deport her and she requests a deportation hearing
before an IJ. If she contests the grounds for the deportation order and wins, she could apply for
EAJA fees for defending against the deportation order in the hearing. Her claim would be that the
government's position in prompting the deportation hearing was not substantially justified.
But in many asylum cases, because the asylum seeker concedes the grounds for deportation (thus
conceding that the INS's position on deportation is substantially justified), she can probably only win
EAJA fees on appeal. By raising her asylum claim as an affirmative request for relief from deporta-
tion, the asylum seeker bears the burden of proof establishing that she has a well-founded fear of
persecution. Even if she establishes eligibility and is granted asylum by the IJ, the INS can probably
not be held not substantially justified for merely opposing the asylum claim in the initial hearing
before the IJ, because the applicant is not contesting any action on the government's part that resulted
in the deportation hearing. The underlying issue is deportation, which the applicant concedes. In this
situation EAJA fees would only be available on appeal of the IJ's decision.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1459
administrative settings where the EAJA applies, such as NLRB adjudica-
tions, the EAJA award may be made against the government merely for
causing the adversary adjudication to be held; the BAJA fee applicant
contests the government's action that prompted the adjudication in the
first instance. But the fact that BAJA fees will in many asylum cases only
be available for work performed on appeals to the BIA or the federal
courts of appeals will not limit the Act's effectiveness because so many
"asylum cases are won only on appeal.5 9
B. Escobar Ruiz and the Legal Debate
The INS and the Justice Department have long contended that the
EAJA does not apply at all to deportation hearings,"0 but the issue was
not tested in court until recently. In Escobar Ruiz I, ' and Escobar Ruiz
11,6 the INS objected to the application of the EAJA to deportation pro-
ceedings on two major grounds. First, the INS claimed that the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act specifically precludes the application of any
fee-shifting statute to immigration hearings because the Act gives the alien
a right to counsel in such hearings, but not at the government's expense.6 3
The court in Escobar Ruiz I squarely rejected this argument."
The INS then petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the EAJA only
59. See supra note 46.
60. The regulations implementing the EAJA in Justice Department administrative proceedings,
47 Fed. Reg. 15,776 (1982) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 24.103 (1988)), omit deportation hearings from
the list of covered proceedings.
Although Congress did not specifically consider immigration proceedings during the debate over the
passage of the EAJA, the Act was intended to have general application to agency adversary adjudica-
tions involving eligible parties. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4988. This is especially
clear when the EAJA is contrasted to other fee-shifting statutes which are issue-specific. See The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1988).
61. 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff, a Salvadoran trade unionist, sought asylum but was
ordered deported at a hearing in which he appeared pro se. Plaintiff subsequently found pro bono
counsel and moved to reopen and file for asylum. Before the circuit court ruled on his appeal, the INS
voluntarily reopened the proceedings. Plaintiff then filed for EAJA fees for his attorney's work before
the Ninth Circuit and the BIA. Id. at 1296. Though the court held that the EAJA did apply to work
done in IJ and BIA immigration proceedings, it did not address the central issue of whether such
proceedings are deemed "adversary adjudications" under the EAJA. See infra notes 64-66.
62. 813 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. The INS argued that the EAJA's key section contains an exception which precludes its appli-
cation to immigration proceedings. The EAJA applies "except as otherwise specifically provided by
statute." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The INS argued that a provision in the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act (INA) "specifically otherwise provided" (thus precluding application
of the EAJA) that "[i n any [BIA or IJ proceedings] the person concerned shall have the privilege of
being represented (at no expense to the Government)" barred the application of the EAJA. Escobar
Ruiz I, 787 F.2d at 1296-97 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982)(emphasis added)).
64. 787 F.2d at 1296-97. The court held that Congress, in enacting the EAJA, intended the
phrase "except as otherwise specifically provided by statute" to prevent the EAJA from superseding
other existing specific fee-shifting statutes. But the INA is not such a statute, since it contains no
provision for awarding fees. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "[d]eportation proceedings before the
IJ and the BIA. . . are precisely the type of proceedings to which Congress intended [the EAJA] to
apply." Id.
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applies to administrative proceedings that are "adversary adjudications,'"6"
and that immigration proceedings are not included within that term."'
The court, in Escobar Ruiz II, dismissed this argument as well, reasoning
that the legislative history of the EAJA shows that Congress meant to
cover this type of proceeding.6
7
C. Deterring Routine INS. Opposition to Asylum Claims
In addition to the arguments advanced by the Ninth Circuit, this Note
argues for application of the EAJA to asylum proceedings to further the
three purposes of the Act: enabling small parties to defend against unjusti-
fied government actions, deterring such government action, and improving
the quality of government policy through increased exposure to litigation.
Critics have pointed to several aspects of INS asylum procedure and
policy that contravene the asylum provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act:
ideological biases in asylum determinations," the powerful weight ac-
corded general foreign policy considerations through reliance on State De-
partment advisory opinions on asylum claims,69 and denial of notice of
both the right to apply for asylum and the right to counsel in asylum
hearings.70
Application of the EAJA in asylum adjudications by IJs and the BIA
will serve the three purposes of the EAJA by: (1) aiding asylum appli-
cants who are often deterred from pressing their claims on appeal, (2)
deterring the INS from litigating clearly meritorious claims or pursuing
unjustified policies, and (3) promoting more adversarial testing of the gov-
65. Fee awards were limited to adversary adjudications partly to narrow the scope of the Act and
thus reduce its estimated costs. H.R. REp. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4993.
66. The EAJA defines "adversary adjudication" as "an adjudication under section 554 of this title
[the Administrative Procedure Act] in which the position of the United States is represented by cotin-
sel. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(0) (Supp. IV 1986). Thus administrative proceedings are covered by
the EAJA if: (1) they are considered adversary adjudications under the APA; and (2) the government
is represented in those proceedings by counsel. The government has conceded that it is represented by
counsel in deportation hearings. Escobar Ruiz III, 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).
It argues, however, that the phrase "adjudication under section 554 [of the APA]," meant only
those proceedings that were governed directly by the APA. Since immigration proceedings are not
governed by the APA, the INS claimed that they are thus not covered by the EAJA. In support the
INS cited Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (hearing provisions of the APA do not apply to
deportation hearings). Escobar Ruiz II, 813 F.2d 283, 287 (1987).
67. The court rejected the argument in favor of Escobar Ruiz's position that "an adjudication
under section 554" meant an adjudication as defined under that section. 813 F.2d. at 291. The court
reasoned that both interpretations were plausible, but found stronger support for Escobar Ruiz's
broader interpretation in the legislative history of the EAJA and in the Statement accompanying the
Model Rules for the Implementation of the EAJA. Id. at 289.
The court then held that deportation hearings were adversary adjudications as defined under 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 813 F.2d at 283, affd Escobar Ruiz III, 838 F.2d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 1988).
This section defines adjudications as those "required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 554 (a). Deportation proceedings are required
to be on the record after a hearing. Id.
68. See infra notes 81-82.
69. Id.
70. See Orantes-Hernandez v. INS, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1506-08 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
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ernment's actions towards asylum seekers and thus fostering greater preci-
sion and fairness in the INS's interpretation of the 1980 Refugee Act.
First, availability of the EAJA may attract more representation for asy-
lum seekers,"' whose numbers have increased significantly since the termi-
nation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) am-
nesty program. 2 Given the asylum seeker's cultural disadvantages, 3 legal
representation is especially critical to her success. 74 Although refugees
seeking asylum have a statutory right to be represented by counsel, they
have no right to appointed counsel.7 5 Since asylum seekers are often too
poor to retain private counsel and are generally ineligible for representa-
tion by legal services offices using Legal Services Corporation funding,76
many are without representation.7
71. Attorneys may be attracted by the possibility of receiving fees in meritorious cases and un-
derfunded legal service organizations may be able to stretch their limited budgets with fee awards. Cf
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 741 (1986) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act improves civil
rights victims' ability to employ counsel).
72. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). See Salvadorans and Guatemalans After Am-
nesty: Squeezed Out ofJobs, Afraid to Go Home, REFUGEE REP., May 20, 1988, at 4-5. One reason
for this reported increase is that recently liberalized INS employment authorization regulations permit
asylum applicants who file a nonfrivolous application to receive work authorization immediately. 8
C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(c)(8), 274a.13 (1988). Combined with enforcement of the employment sanctions of
IRCA, many illegal aliens who previously feared applying for asylum and who did not apply or were
rejected for amnesty under IRCA may now apply for asylum in order to retain or to gain employ-
ment. See Martin, The End of De Facto Asylum: Toward a Humane and Realistic Response to
Refugee Challenges, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L. REV. 161, 163-64 (1987).
73. Many asylum seekers do not speak English, see Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 586 (S.D.
Tex. 1982), or are unfamiliar with our legal system and of their legal right to apply for asylum. See
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F.Supp. 351, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Few can navigate complex
immigration laws and asylum procedures on their own. See Escobar Ruiz II, 813 F.2d 283, 292 (9th
Cir. 1987).
74. See Reyes-Palacios v. INS, 836 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1988). Lawyers help document
threats and persecution, which is especially important since refugees rarely have much evidence. An
attorney can counsel the refugee and explain options. See Note, Toward a Meaningful Right to Coun-
sel for Refugees in Exclusion Proceedings, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 297, 302 (1983).
Counsel must persuade the refugee to present her testimony in the best possible light to an IJ. This
is difficult because asylum seekers often fear and distrust government officials, given their unhappy
experiences with authorities in their native countries. Statement of Lynn Alvarez of El Rescate, New
York University Conference on Immigration Reform (Mar. 7, 1987) (on file with author). Without
counsel, asylum seekers tend to make inconsistent and damaging statements to IJs and the INS be-
cause they say what they think a particular official wishes to hear at the time. See E. HULL, WrrH-
OUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 108 (1985).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982).
76. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1626.3, 1626.4 (1988). Except to the limited extent that legal services offices
receive special, non-LSC funding, they cannot represent undocumented aliens seeking political
asylum.
77. No definitive figures exist regarding the level of representation for asylum seekers. However,
especially at the several detention centers operated by the INS in remote areas, there are generally
only a handful of inexperienced attorneys available to represent the thousands of asylum seeking
detainees. See Note, INS Transfer Policy: Interference with Detained Aliens' Due Process Right to
Retain Counsel, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2001, 2005-06 (1987). When the newest and largest (capacity
6000) detention center opened in 1986 in Oakdale, Louisiana-two hundred miles from a major
city-there were five attorneys in the town, none of whom had ever taken an immigration case. Inter-
view with Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee For Human Rights in New
York City (Apr. 14, 1986).
The effect of the INS detention program is to further deny asylum seekers' access to counsel and
increase the difficulties they face in understanding their options and applying for asylum. See
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Second, the EAJA may deter routine INS opposition to asylum claims
by exposing the INS to fee awards in cases in which opposition is not
justified under the facts or the law. Under the Reagan Administration the
INS instituted a new recruitment policy to attract younger and more ag-
gressive trial attorneys, many of them from the Justice Department, to
prosecute deportation cases. The result has been vigorous opposition to
adjudicated asylum claims, often irrespective of the merits, in contrast to
the traditionally passive approach to litigation taken by INS trial
attorneys. 8
The deterrent effect of the EAJA may be particularly strong in the
asylum context because the INS has already been subject to some of the
largest EAJA awards made in civil litigation since the passage of the
Act.79 Since the same INS lawyers who worked on these court cases liti-
gate and supervise individual asylum cases before the BIA, they may have
learned from their experiences and change their practices.
Further, the EAJA may deter the INS from considering ideological bias
and foreign policy concerns, which, critics contend, continue to dominate
the asylum process.80 Evidence suggests, for example, that it is much eas-
ier for aliens from Communist nations or countries hostile to the United
States to obtain asylum, irrespective of the strength of their individual
claims.81 A prime source of this foreign policy bias is the declining but
still significant influence that the State Department has over asylum deci-
sions through the customary issuance of advisory opinions.8 2
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1501-02, 1509-11 (C.D. Cal. 1988); Rios-Berrios
v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1985); Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to
United States Refugee Policy-Foreword, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 499 (1986); Helton,
The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353,
365 (1986).
78. Interview with Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and former Acting Commissioner of the INS (May 2, 1988).
79. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 382, 387-88, 393 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(awarding $441,000 in EAJA fees where government consciously developed Haitian program to facil-
itate deportation without consideration of requests for asylum and INS "used its considerable re-
sources to oppress plaintiff class"), affd, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986); Louis v. Nelson, 646 F.
Supp. 1300 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (EAJA award exceeding S 1 million for not substantially justified gov-
ernment policy of mass exclusion hearings and detention for all Haitian refugees effected without
notice or publication).
80. See supra note 3.
81. A review of cases decided by INS district directors (statistics on asylum adjudications before
IJs are not currently available) during the 1987 fiscal year shows that the range of the percentages of
asylum grants made (versus the number decided) for applications from nations hostile to the United
States was 84% (Syria and Nicaragua) to 20% (Hungary). For seven Western aligned nations the
range was 26% to 0.0%, with El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras and the Philippines all below
5%. INS statistics reprinted in REFUGEE REP., Dec. 18, 1987, at 15.
82. IJs and the BIA often defer to the "advisory" opinions issued by the State Department's
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), because they lack independent
knowledge about political conditions in an asylum seeker's native country. See Preston, Asylum Adju-
dications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International
Obligations? 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 112-114, 128-33 (1986); Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MIcH.
J.L. REF. 183, 193 (1984). The State Department opinion became the decisive factor in many asylum
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Since the advisory opinion usually becomes a part of the record of the
asylum hearing, it could be reviewed along with the rest of the govern-
ment's position to determine whether the INS was substantially justified
in contesting an asylum claim. If the INS relied on the advisory opinion,
and the opinion stated no individualized reason for recommending against
finding eligibility for asylum, the INS could be found liable for an EAJA
award for contesting an applicant's case on appeal. Such an award could
deter future reliance on the State Department Report.
Finally, availability of the EAJA in asylum adjudications will serve a
third EAJA objective by spurring increased litigation of asylum claims
and thus promoting greater BIA judicial review and modification of
emerging government standards of discretion. After INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca,3 which significantly liberalized the standards for asylum eligi-
bility, more asylum seekers are passing the eligibility hurdle; thus, more
IJs are deciding asylum cases on discretionary grounds.8 The establish-
ment of standards for the exercise and limitation of discretion through
increased litigation will be critical to the success of future asylum seekers.
While the standard of judicial review for a discretionary denial of asylum
is less stringent (abuse of discretion) than the standard for eligibility de-
terminations (substantial evidence), several appeals of discretionary asy-
lum denials have been successful.8 5
cases. See Preston, supra, at 128-33; Note, Discrimination in Asylum Law: The Implications ofJean
v. Nelson, 62 IND. L.J. 127, 141-2 (1986).
This process disadvantages the asylum seeker because she cannot directly confront the State De-
partment sources at her hearing. Further, the advisbry opinion is often based on a political compro-
mise within the State Department in which U.S. foreign policy objectives, not factors appropriate to
individual adjudication as required by the 1980 Refugee Act, control. Preston, supra, at 117-18. In
some instances the advisory opinions contain no references to the facts of an individual case. Rios-
Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1985) (undated advisory opinion on petitioner's asylum
claim "containled] no reference to facts of petitioner's case," yet concluded petitioner's fear of persecu-
tion not well-founded).
Responding to critics who have urged that the State Department's role in the adjudication process
be limited to offering information on general country conditions rather than recommendations on
individual cases, see Preston, supra, at 138-40, the INS recently indicated that the State Department
will reduce the number of advisory opinions it issues. BHRHA Cuts Down Advisory Opinions, 64
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1215 (Nov. 2, 1987). In addition the Justice Department has instructed
asylum adjudicators to pose specific questions to the BHRHA in cases in which they are unable to
render a decision without advice from the State Department. 53 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1988). These regula-
tions may reduce the incidence and influence of non-individualized advisory opinions.
83. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) ("well-founded fear" standard for asylum not equivalent to harder to
meet "clear probability" of persecution standard for withholding of deportation).
84. See Anker, supra note 50, at 4. In the past, few asylum cases were decided on discretionary
grounds, most were based on eligibility. Id.
85. See, e.g., Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988) (in exercise of discretion BIA
must make findings; BIA failed to specify facts relevant to its discretionary denial and failed to indi-
cate it had considered any factor other than drug conviction); Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384
(7th Cir. 1987) (BIA failed to weigh or even mention relevant factors in discretionary asylum denial).
Where the law of discretion in asylum cases is dear, for instance that an asylum seeker's manner of
entry into the United States is only one of several factors which must be considered in exercising
discretion to grant or deny an eligible asylum applicant, Matter of Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA
Sept. 22, 1987), the INS may not be substantially justified in opposing an eligible applicant's appeal
from an IJ's adverse denial of discretion based solely on manner of entry.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE EAJA IN THE
AGENCY CONTEXT
While application of the EAJA to asylum adjudications furthers the
purposes of the EAJA by aiding asylum seekers and deterring unjustified
INS litigation, the EAJA is not a perfect vehicle for achieving its own
goals. This Section discusses two proposed clarifications of the EAJA that
would strengthen its application in the asylum context. Both recommenda-
tions stem from and build on the 1985 amendments to the EAJA that
clarified and liberalized the terms of the original Act to counter restrictive
court and agency interpretations. First, Congress should clarify the "sub-
stantially justified" standard and overrule the recent restrictive Supreme
Court interpretation of the phrase. Second, the Justice Department should
prohibit excessive agency review of fee decisions made by IJs or the BIA.
A. Amend the "Substantially Justified" Standard
The leading reason cited for denials of EAJA fee awards is that the
government has met its burden of showing that its position was substan-
tially justified."" But the phrase is not defined in the text of the EAJA,
and the circuits have split over its interpretation. Prior to the 1985 reen-
actment, a majority of circuits interpreted "substantially justified" as mere
reasonableness. The legislative history of the original EAJA supports
this position."8 But a "more than mere reasonableness" standard is sup-
ported by the legislative history of the 1985 EAJA Amendments, 9 al-
though Congress did not actually amend the statutory language.90 Since
86. For fiscal year 1987, 61 per cent of denials in the federal courts were made because a court
found substantial justification of the government's position. 1987 Cis. REP. supra note 33, at 101. In
agency adjudications, the comparable figure for fiscal year 1985 (the last year for which these figures
are available) is 40 per cent. 1985 ACUS REP., supra note 36, at app. V.
87. But some circuits initially held the government to a slightly higher standard than "reasonable-
ness." See Cinciarelli v. Regan, 729 F.2d 801, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12 at 4992 ("The test of whether or not a government
action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. .... the government must show
that its case had a reasonable basis in law and fact.").
An important caveat is that the Report concluded that where a prevailing party "has had to engage
in lengthy administrative proceedings before final vindication of his or her rights in the courts, the
government should have to make a strong showing to demonstrate that its action was reasonable." Id.
at 4997 (emphasis added). See NRDC v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying strong
showing standard because "EPA knew all along that its position was legally untenable" and finding
EPA not substantially justified). This implies a higher than "mere reasonableness" standard for those
cases, for instance, in which an asylum seeker had to litigate his clearly meritorious claim case to the
federal court of appeals just to establish her eligibility for asylum.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 138. "Because in 1980 Congress rejected a stan-
dard of 'reasonably justified' in favor of 'substantially justified,' the test must be more than mere
reasonableness." Id.
90. Congress may have believed that the clarification in the House Report, the authoritative legis-
lative history for the 1985 amendments, would suffice to offer the courts direction on interpretation.
One commentator has suggested that Congress did not change the language because it felt that the
issue was complex and better left to be adjudicated on a case by case basis with guidance from legisla-
tive history. Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 5059 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
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1985 six circuits have adhered to this "more than mere reasonableness"
test;9" four others still retain the "mere reasonableness" standard;9 2 and
three circuits have failed to decide the issue."' Agency adjudicators have
also divided on the standard for substantial justification.9
Most recently, in Pierce v. Underwood,95 the Supreme Court held, by a
5-3 majority, that "substantially justified" means "justified to a degree
that could satisfy a reasonable person," which it equated with the "mere
reasonableness standard."'96 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, re-
jected as unauthoritative the legislative history in the House Report of the
1985 reeneactment that suggested that "more than mere reasonableness"
was the correct standard.97 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, argued in dissent for the more than mere reasonableness
standard, based on a full reading of the legislative history.9
The "more than reasonableness" standard conforms with the legislative
history of the 1985 Amendments and the purpose of the EAJA. In view of
the restrictive holding in Underwood, Congress should amend the text of
the EAJA to adopt this broader interpretation. The "more than mere rea-
sonableness standard" would not require an automatic fee award in all
cases in which substantial evidence does not support the government's po-
sition (the standard for judicial review of eligibility for asylum claims).99
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1984) (Statement of David Stewart, on behalf of Small Business League
Defense Comm.).
91. See, e.g., Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(en banc) ("clearly reasonable"); Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir.
1986)("slightly more than reasonable"); Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31, 38 n.7 (3d Cir. 1986) (more
than merely reasonable); Riddle v. Secretary, 817 F.2d 1238, 1244 (6th Cir. 1987) (same), vacated
and reh'g granted, 823 F.2d 164 (6th Cir 1987); United States v. 1,378.65 Acres of Land, 794 F.2d
1313, 1318 (8th Cir. 1986)("clearly reasonable, well founded in law and fact, solid though not neces-
sarily correct"); Haitian Refugee Center v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489, 1497 (11th Cir. 1986) (more than
mere reasonableness).
92. Pullen v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1987); Phil Smidt & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 810
F.2d 638, 642 n.5 (7th Cir. 1987); Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 775 F.2d 1284, 1289 (5th Cir.
1985); United States v. Yoffe, 775 F.2d 447, 449-50 (1st Cir. 1985).
93. See Rosado v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1987); Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman,
817 F.2d 484, 498 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Charles Gyurman Land & Cattle Co. 836 F.2d
480, 483 (10th Cir. 1987) (permitting district courts to articulate test as clearly reasonable or
reasonable).
94. See e.g., Appeal of Input Output Computer Services, Inc., GSBCA No. 8435(7090) at 14
(available on Westlaw 1988) (clearly reasonable); A & J Construction Co., Inc. Application for Attor-
ney Fees, IBCA No. 2376-F, at 5 (available on Westlaw 1988) (same).
95. 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
96. Id. at 2550.
97. Id. at 2550-01 Justice Scalia wrote that the House Committee Report on the reenactment of
the EAJA endorsing the more than mere reasonableness standard inexplicably contradicted prior pre-
cedent and original legislative history which supported the mere reasonableness standard. Id. at 2551.
98. Id. at 2555-57. Justice Brennan pointed out that in originally enacting the EAJA the Senate
considered but rejected the language "reasonably justified" in favor of "substantially justified" and
that it did not intend to equate "substantial" with "reasonable." Justice Brennan also stressed that the
1985 legislative history should be given some weight and noted that several circuits had adopted a
higher than mere reasonableness standard following that directive in the 1985 House Report. Id. at
2555-57.
99. For an early argument in favor of automatic fee awards see Note, Reenacting the Equal
Access to Justice Act: A Proposalfor Automatic Attorney's Fees Awards, 94 YALE L. J. 1207 (1985).
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But it would ensure that the government will not escape liability for an
award when an agency adjudicator or a court finds only some basis for
reasonableness in the government's position.
B. Limit Agency Review of Fee Decisions
Another flaw in the EAJA is the ambiguous procedure governing
agency review of fee decisions made by administrative adjudicators. The
1985 EAJA reenactment included an amendment indicating that the
"agency" shall make the final administrative decision on a fee applica-
tion.100 Previously the Act provided that the final administrative decision
on a fee application be made by the adjudicative officer, an IJ, for exam-
ple. The legislative history of this section is sparse and confusing, but it
appears that Congress wanted to ensure that administrative decisions on
fees were reviewed along the same appeals path as the merits.1 °
Because in most administrative adversary adjudications the agency re-
views the decision of an ALJ on appeal, it is appropriate that the agency
also review the fee decision of the ALJ. Thus, in the asylum context, the
BIA should review a fee application decision made by an IJ, because the
BIA normally reviews the merits of an IJ's decision.102
Under the current EAJA, although the "agency" and not the "adjudi-
cative officer" may make the final fee application decision, it is not clear
whether the agency can review a fee decision when it is not entitled to
review the merits of the case. The concern is that pursuant to the 1985
amendment, the Justice Department may add an additional layer of ad-
ministrative review for EAJA fee decisions which does not exist for the
merits of an asylum case. For example, the Justice Department might
permit or require a high official within the EOIR to review all fee awards
made by IJs or the BIA. That official's decision could be the final
"agency" decision, even though he has no authority to review the merits of
the asylum case upon which the fee decision is based. 0 ' The Justice De-
100. "The decision of the agency on the application for fees and other expenses shall be the final
administrative decision under this section." Pub L. No. 99-80, § 1(a)(3), 99 Stat. 183 (amending 5
U.S.C. § 504(a)(3) (1982).
101. The House Report gives a very brief explanation for the new language, stating that "it
follows the view adopted by the Administrative Conference and recognizes the fact that decisions [on
the merits] in administrative proceedings are generally not final until they have been adopted by the
agency." H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 142.
102. The first bill to reenact the EAJA, H.R. 5479 (1984) (vetoed by President Reagan, see
Presidential Memorandum of Disapproval of H.R. 5479, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1814-15
(Nov. 8, 1984)), included a section intended "to clarify the original Congressional intent to make fee
award decisions of adjudicative officers final." H.R. REP. No. 992, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1984).
Under this earlier bill, appellate boards in agencies, such as the BIA, would not have been permitted
to review fee application decisions, because Congress feared the conflict of interest arising when an
agency which must pay fee awards from its own budget reviews such awards made by an ALJ against
the agency. Id.
103. This problem also arises in contract appeals board cases, where the agency litigates before an
independent contract appeals board. Congress explicitly brought these proceedings under the EAJA's
coverage in 1985. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 144. Decisions by these boards are
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partment's resolution of this question in its newly revised EAJA imple-
menting regulations will be particularly important because if the INS de-
cided to add an additional layer of review for fee decisions, few BIA or IJ
awards would likely be upheld on review by the EOIR.10' This extra
layer of review for fee decisions would require prevailing parties to appeal
fee denials or reduced award decisions to the federal courts of appeals on
a routine basis, which might deter applicants and decrease the effective-
ness of the BAJA in immigration proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Applying the EAJA in asylum adjudications would serve the objectives
of the BAJA by providing monetary incentive to counsel to pursue ap-
peals of meritorious asylum cases; by deterring unreasonable INS opposi-
tion in such cases and unreasonable asylum policies challenged in such
adjudications; and finally, by exposing more INS asylum decisions to ad-
versarial testing, thus encouraging greater INS compliance with the asy-
lum provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act. The effectiveness of the EAJA in
achieving these objectives will depend on how the Justice Department im-
plements the EAJA and on how Congress reacts to the Supreme Court's
decision in Pierce v. Underwood. Application of the EAJA is no panacea
for the problems faced by asylum seekers in deportation hearings but it
may significantly deter unjustified INS opposition to meritorious claims.
generally appealable directly to the federal courts of appeals.
The Administrative Conference of the United States' Model Rules for implementing the EAJA
recommend that the fee appeals process in contract appeals board cases conform to the existing merits
appeals process. I C.F.R. Alt. § 315.308 (1988); see also 1985 ACUS REP., supra note 36, at 7
(Model Rules concluded that new language in EAJA not intended to create a new layer of agency
review where none existed before, but rather to preserve existing channels of review),
But some agencies rejected the Model Rules approach in their EAJA regulations, allowing the
agency to review board EAJA decisions. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) regulations require that NASA review fee decisions made by the NASA Board of
Contract Appeals. 14 C.F.R. § 1262.308 (1988).
104. The current Justice Department regulations, implemented prior to the EAJA's reenactment,
are ambiguous regarding additional review of fee decisions. 28 C.F.R. § 24.307 (1988). They call for
the fee decision of the adjudicative officer (here the IJ or the BIA) to be "reviewed to the extent
permitted by law by the Department in accordance with the Department's procedures for the type of
proceeding involved. The Department will issue the final decision on the application." Id. The term
"Department" is defined as the "relevant Departmental component which is conducting the adversary
adjudication," id. at § 24.102(d), which is the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) for
asylum adjudications. See supra note 54. The EOIR's procedures for review of asylum adjudications
call for direct appeals from the BIA to the federal circuit courts of appeals. Yet the last quoted
sentence, mandating that the Department make the final decision on the application, could mean that
an additional office or official within the EOIR or perhaps elsewhere in the Justice Department could
review the BIA's fee decision.
1476
